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1 Introduction
Firms wishing to import intermediate inputs from foreign markets either re-
quire a local foreign partner, who acts as an independent input supplier or
need to set up their own affiliates. The choice of sourcing modes plays a key
role in strategic management decisions and has triggered considerable research
effort into international organization of production. In a new body of work,
trade theorists have started to bring modern theories of the firm into models of
international trade. 1 Seminal contributions include McLaren (2000), Antra`s
(2003; 2005), Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2002;
2003, 2005).
Part of this literature focuses on contract incompleteness occurring because
firms cannot specify all possible contingencies, in particular when they operate
in foreign markets. In Antra`s (2003), a final good producer decides whether to
source a specific intermediate input through an independent foreign supplier
or to integrate it. Possible cost sharing for specific investments leads to a hold-
up problem. As emphasized by Antra`s (2003), a firm’s organizational choice
depends heavily on the share of intermediate inputs within the industry that
requires the engagement of suppliers. In particular, the final-good producer
can alleviate the hold-up problem by offering the supplier a larger share of
revenue by using outsourcing when the industry is intensive in intermediate
inputs produced by the supplier. If the share of inputs that are produced by
the final-good producer is large enough, then it should keep the residual rights
of control and should integrate the supplier.
An interesting extension of Antra`s (2003) is made by Antra`s and Helpman
(2004) who consider heterogeneity in firm-level productivity. As in Melitz
1 See Spencer (2005), and Helpman (2006) for detailed surveys of the literature.
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(2003), the final-good producer draws its productivity randomly from a com-
mon distribution and decides to produce only after paying a fixed cost of
entry. Antra`s and Helpman (2004) assume that the fixed cost of production
abroad is lower by outsourcing than with vertical integration. Since the most
productive firms can compensate for the foreign affiliate set-up costs, the most
productive firms in the headquarter-intensive sector will source their inputs
internally. The Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model could well explain why the
share of U.S. intra-firm import decreases from 43.7% in 1990 to 39.4% 1999.
The assumption concerning the ranking of fixed costs is crucial; reversing it
leads to opposite findings (Grossman et al., 2005). It might explain the increase
of French intra-firm trade from 19% in 1990 to 35.8% in 1998.
When contracts are incomplete, cross-countries differences in the contracting
environment might also explain the prevalence of sourcing modes. The idea
that the judicial quality of a country influences the hold-up problem and the
value of specific investment was first developed by Nunn (2007). Thus, goods
requiring substantial relationship-specific investments tend to be produced in
countries with good contract-enforcement institutions. This concept is applied
to the organizational choice by Antra`s and Helpman (2008) who show that
final-good producers and suppliers will be unwilling to make relationship-
specific investments in countries with poor contract enforcement institutions.
So far, empirical evidence using firm-level data on outsourcing is scarce. Tomiura
(2007) uses detailed data on Japanese firms and shows that Japanese multi-
national firms that export through their affiliates are more productive than
firms that outsource. This productivity ordering is robust even when firm size,
factor intensity, and/or industry are controlled. In a related paper, Tomiura
(2005), shows how firms tend to outsource more of their activities overseas
when their productivity is higher - or when their products are more labor-
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intensive. Using French firm-level data, Raspiller and Sillard (2004) show that
French multinational firms trade intermediate inputs through their affiliates
when their production process uses advertising intensively.
This study examines the role of a firm’s productivity and of its intensity in
suppliers’ input for its organizational decision. We build on a theoretical model
that incorporates the main features of Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and use
French-level data. We slightly change the model by introducing a production
function that allows both the productivity and the cost share of input pro-
vided by suppliers, to vary across firms. In addition, we consider in particular
the case when the supplier’s input is produced abroad. We assume contrary
to Antra`s and Helpman (2004) that fixed costs associated to outsourcing are
higher than those under vertical integration. Contrary to U.S. firms, French
firms perceive outsourcing to be related to higher fixed costs (SESSI survey,
1999). At least 70% of French firms think that trading with an affiliate re-
duces organization costs. According to Williamson (1985), vertical integration
reduces fixed costs because it amalgamates the coordination costs of two orga-
nizations. An implication of the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) sorting result is
that industries with greater dispersion in productivity should feature a larger
share of intra-firm imports conducted by multinational firms. This prediction
is confirmed by the empirical works of Yeaple (2006) and Bernard et al. (2007).
Applying his methodology to the French data, we find a negative correlation
between productivity dispersion within sector and the share of intra-firm im-
port. 2 This results suggests a reverse ranking of fixed costs for French firms.
Our theoretical model gives three important predictions for the organizational
choice that faces final-good producers. Assuming a higher fixed-cost under out-
sourcing, we show that firms outsource when (i) they intensively use suppliers’
2The results are available in Table D.1 of Appendix D.
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inputs in their production process, (ii) they simultaneously are highly produc-
tive and intensively use suppliers’ inputs in their production process, and (iii)
they are highly productive and import inputs from countries that have sound
contracting environments.
This paper makes two specific contributions to the related empirical literature.
First, we use a new data set at firm-level which contains superior information
compared to previous studies. Second, our empirical specification follows di-
rectly from theory; especially in the case of the intensity in suppliers’ inputs.
We use detailed French firm-level data to estimate the predictions of the model.
The database provides a geographical breakdown of French firms’ imports at
product level (HS4) and their sourcing modes – through independent suppli-
ers and/or affiliates – in 1999. This data also includes information that allows
a distinction to be made between intermediate inputs and final goods. The
survey, which has been carried out by the SESSI, includes French firms trad-
ing more than 1 million Euro and that are owned by manufacturing groups
that control at least 50% of the equity capital of their foreign affiliate. These
limitations sharply reduce the number of participants. However, the cover-
age remains significant. The survey covers 55% of French total imports and
61% of French total exports. In the present analysis, we focus on 2619 French
importers which carry out 72391 transactions. However, the survey provides
little information at firm-level. We retrieve this information from the EAE
database on the balance sheet and income statement of all firms located in
France that have more than 20 employees. 3 The data is annual from 1996 to
2002.
The previous literature has approximated the parameter of the headquarter
intensity in the Cobb-Douglas production function by sector-specific variables
3 EAE: Enqueˆte Annuelle d’Entreprises.
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such as capital and/or skill intensities (Antra`s, 2003; Bernard et al. (2007);
Nunn and Trefler, 2008; Yeaple, 2006). We propose a measure of the intensity
in suppliers’ input which is directly mapped from theory: it is the total use
of intermediate inputs from suppliers in the French firm production process.
This measure has the main advantage of being firm-specific and to be directly
related to the cost share of input provided by suppliers of the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
Contrary to the previous, related, literature, we have estimated a firm’s to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology
because it has two main advantages over the standard measures of productiv-
ity, such as value-added over employment. First, this methodology takes into
account the selection bias that arises because we only observe firms that are
included in the survey and which are likely to be the most productive. Sec-
ond, it solves the endogeneity problem that arises because inputs are chosen
by firms according to their productivity.
To test the prediction of the model, our empirical specifications take into
account the non linear interaction term between the productivity, the inten-
sity in suppliers’ input and the contracting environment. We follow Ai and
Norton (2003) and use their estimation methodology that allows interpreting
multiplicative terms in logit models.
In line with the theoretical prediction, we find that firms that have a pro-
duction process intensive in suppliers’ inputs do source through independent
suppliers. Moreover, we find that the most productive firms source their in-
puts through independent suppliers. The higher the intensity of the production
process in suppliers’ inputs, the larger the effect. Contrary to our theoretical
prediction, we find that a better contracting environment increases the likeli-
hood of importing inputs from affiliates. This result is likely to be in line with
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the theoretical prediction of the Antra`s and Helpman (2008) model that al-
lows inputs to be partially contractible. They show that if a better contracting
environment reduces the non-contractible share of the suppliers’ input, then
the incentives required by the headquarter will increase.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the
theoretical background and the testable implications of the model. Section 3
presents the data and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 proposes a
first look at the data. Section 5 presents our main results and provides some
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we slightly modify the Antra`s and Helpman (2004) model and
review its core testable implication for firm-level data analysis. We denote by
v a vertically integrated firm that sources inputs abroad through its affiliate.
We use the subscript o for a firm that sources inputs abroad through an
independent supplier. 4
2.1 Set-up
Consumers are assumed to share Dixit-Stiglitz preferences for differentiated
products which generate the inverse demand function pj(i) = Djxj(i)
α−1 for
variety i in sector j. pj(i) is the price of this variety, xj(i) is the quantity
demanded, Dj is an index of total demand for the output of sector j, and
the elasticity of demand is equal to 1/(1− α) and is larger than one. All final
goods are freely traded with zero transport costs, such that Dj measures world
4As we consider only the case where the supplier’s input is produced abroad, it
should read “vertical integration offshore” and “outsourcing offshore” instead. Off-
shoring means that the production of the inputs occurs in a foreign country.
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demand for the output of sector j.
Each sector j produces a differentiated good under monopolistic-competition.
The production of the final good requires the use of two specialized interme-
diate inputs, xh and xm. xh is produced locally by a headquarter, HQ, with
a wage that is normalized to one. xm is sourced from supplier, M , located
in foreign country, l, where the wages is wl < 1. Throughout this paper, we
rule out the possibility of sourcing xm from a national supplier and focus on
an international fragmented production process. As in Antra`s and Helpman
(2004), we assume the output of variety i to be a Cobb-Douglas function of
these inputs:
Qi = θ
[
xh
1− z
]1−z [xm
z
]z
0 < z < 1 (1)
θ is the firm-specific productivity parameter. (1− z) is the “intensity in head-
quarter services”. We depart from Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and assume
that z is firm-specific. A higher z is associated with a more intensive use of
the intermediate input from supplier M in production. z thus represents the
intensity in supplier’s input.
Upon paying a fixed cost fk - which we label in national units of labor -
and observing its productivity, θ, the headquarter, HQ, faces a choice when
sourcing its input. It can decide to import inputs from an independent supplier
and pay a fixed cost fo or import them from its affiliate and pay a fixed cost
fv. We assume that sourcing through an independent supplier generates a
higher fixed cost than sourcing through an affiliate because vertical integration
creates economies of scope in the management of diverse activities (Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004).
The transaction between HQ and M involves incomplete contracts because,
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ex-ante the headquarter and the supplier cannot sign enforceable contracts
specifying the purchase of specialized intermediate inputs for a certain price.
They also cannot observe ex-ante the inputs’ quality.
Since xh and xm are entirely customized and have no value outside the rela-
tionship, both firms face a hold-up problem. After the specific investment has
been made, there is renegotiation over how the ex-post quasi rents from the
relationship will be shared.
Denoted by β, the share of ex-post gain from trade obtained by the headquar-
ter. Following the property-rights approach, the ex-post bargaining will take
place both under outsourcing and under vertical integration (Grossman and
Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990). However, the distribution of surplus
is sensitive to the sourcing mode. More precisely, the outside option of the
headquarter would be equal to zero under outsourcing, but would be equal
to δ ∈ (0, 1) under integration. When it chooses to source inputs through its
affiliate, the HQ owns the residual rights of control and seizes control of the
unit of production. In that case, we assume that the headquarter receives a
fraction δ of the amount of xm, which translates into an outside option of δ
αRv
assuming CES preferences and a constant markup 1/α. Along with Antra`s and
Helpman (2004), we think that δ is related to the protection of property rights
or more generally to the contracting environment of the export country.
Given the bargaining framework, the headquarter receives the fraction βo of
the revenue R(i) under outsourcing and the fraction βv = δ
α+βo(1−δα) under
vertical integration, hence βv > βo. Once the HQ selects the organization
form k, the quantity of intermediate inputs is chosen by M to maximize (1−
βk)R(i)− wlxm, while the quantity chosen by the HQ to maximize βkR(i)−
wNxh. Thus, on one hand, integration yields the headquarter a higher share of
the surplus than under outsourcing. However, on the other hand, the supplier’s
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share of surplus is lower, and the incentives to invest decrease. When choosing
their sourcing mode, the headquarter faces a trade-off between having more
control and inducing more investment from its supplier.
Ex-ante, the supplier pays a transfer T to the headquarter, which ensures
its participation in the relationship which would be equal to its profit. 5 The
choice of ownership is chosen ex-ante by the headquarter to maximize its profit,
which includes the transfer. Then, headquarter profit equals:
pilk = D
1
1−α θα/(1−α)ψlk − f lk (2)
where
ψlk =
1− α[βlk(1− z) + (1− βlk)z][
1
α
(
1
βl
k
)(1−z) (
wl
1−βl
k
)z]α/(1−α) (3)
Given its productivity level θ, the final-good producer chooses the mode of
sourcing and the location of production that maximizes equation (2). It exits
when its productivity level is below a threshold θ, denoted θ, because its
operating profit is negative. On the other hand, firms with θ ≥ θ stay in the
industry and choose their mode of sourcing inputs.
We denote by θ, the threshold productivity level of the firm that is indifferent
between both sourcing modes. Thus, the firms having a larger productivity
level than the productivity threshold θ, choose to import inputs from an in-
dependent supplier. Firms with a productivity between θ and θ will choose to
import inputs from their affiliates. Under the threshold productivity value θ,
firms exit. Using the free-entry condition, we derive the thresholds of produc-
tivity that can be expressed as in Equation (4).
5 See Antra`s (2003) for details.
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θ=D−1/α
[
fv
ψv(z)
](1−α)/α
θ=D−1/α
[
(fo − fv)
ψo(z)− ψv(z)
](1−α)/α
(4)
In order to derive the probability that a firm chooses to source its inputs
arm-length, we follow Helpman et al. (2004) and assume that the producer of
variety i in sector j draws a productivity level θ from a pareto distribution
G(θ) with shape parameter κ.
G(θ) = 1−
(
b
θ
)κ
for θ ≥ b > 0 , (5)
We denote by σk the probability that a firm chooses the organization form
k. Then, σo = [1 − G(θ)]/[1 − G(θ)]. Using the pareto distribution and the
productivity threshold values, we derive the probability, σo = (θ/θ)
κ, that a
firm chooses to source inputs through an independent supplier:
σo =
[
ψo(z)
ψv(z)
− 1
]κ(1−α)/α [
fv
fo − fv
]κ(1−α)/α
(6)
As shown in Antra`s and Helpman (2004), this organizational choice will mostly
depend on the intensity of supplier’s input. Under the assumption of higher
fixed cost under outsourcing, vertical integration yields higher profit than
outsourcing for low enough intensities in supplier’s input (ψ
l
o
ψlv
< 1), while only
the most productive firms will outsource when the intensities in supplier’s
input are high enough (ψ
l
o
ψlv
> 1).
2.2 Testable Implications
The results of this model yield a set of testable predictions concerning the
productivity level of the firm, the intensity in supplier’s inputs and the con-
tracting environment on the prevalence of each sourcing mode.
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2.2.1 Supplier’s Input Intensity, z
The supplier’s input intensity affects the incentive the final good producer
wants to give a supplier. In particular, the more intensive the production is
in intermediate inputs that are produced by the supplier, the larger the share
of revenue the producer wants to give to the supplier. This is possible under
outsourcing where βO < βV .
Testable implication 1. The likelihood of sourcing through an independent
supplier increases with the supplier’s input intensity of the production.
Notice that this result does not depend on the ranking of fixed costs or on the
level of a firm’s productivity.
2.2.2 Productivity, θ.
In Figure 1, we show simulated levels of the critical productivity value and
how they relate to the intensity in supplier’s input. 6
Fig. 1. Firm-level productivity, supplier’s input intensity and sourcing modes
0
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Outsourcing
Intra-firm Trade
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q
q
q
Authors’ computation assuming α = 0.5, wl = 0.1, βo = 0.9, fo = 1, fv = 0.2, δ = 0.5.
6Notice that we carefully choose the value of wl in order to obtain Figure 1. How-
ever, wl does not affect the ratio ψo(z)/ψv(z) in equation 6.
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Outsourcing appears when a firm has simultaneously a high level of produc-
tivity and when its production process is relatively intensive in supplier’s in-
puts. Notice that this result depends on the ranking of fixed costs. If the
fixed cost under integration was higher than the one under outsourcing, then
high-productivity firms that are intensive in headquarter input prefer vertical
integration.
Testable implication 2. The likelihood of sourcing inputs from an indepen-
dent supplier increases with the supplier’s input intensity of the production
and with the productivity of the firm.
2.2.3 Contracting Environment, δl
The model predicts an indirect relationship between the level of firm’s pro-
ductivity and the contracting environment of the export country. We show in
Figure 2 the impact of the firm-level productivity and the contracting envi-
ronment on the critical values of productivity.
Fig. 2. Firm-level productivity, contracting environment and sourcing modes
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Authors’ computation assuming α = 0.5, wl = 0.1, βo = 0.9, fo = 1, fv = 0.2, z = 0.5.
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Since βv = δ
α + βo(1 − δα), a better contracting environment implies a large
bargaining power, δ, for the final-good producer. Given the intensity in sup-
plier’s input, the final-good producer chooses to internalize for a low level of
contracting environment. It gives more incentives to the supplier and chooses
to outsource for a high level of contracting environment. Since the fixed cost
under outsourcing is higher than under vertical integration, only the most
productive final good producer will be able to cover the fixed cost associated
to outsourcing.
Testable implication 3. The likelihood of sourcing inputs from an inde-
pendent supplier increases with the productivity of the firm and the level of
contracting environment of the export country.
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
3.1 Data
This paper uses information from a confidential firm-level survey which pro-
vides information on the trade organization of French firms in 1999. 7 The
data are provided by SESSI (Service des E´tudes Statistiques Industrielles)
The survey was addressed to all French firms trading more than 1 million
Euro, owned by manufacturing groups that control at least 50% of the eq-
uity capital of a foreign affiliate. This limitation sharply reduced the number
of firms that answered the survey. However, the coverage remains significant.
The data covers 55% of total French imports and 61% of total French exports.
We focus on 4249 French importers which carried out 104947 transactions.
The survey provides a detailed geographical breakdown of French firms’ im-
7 E´changes internationaux intra-groupe.
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ports and exports at product level (HS4) and their sourcing modes – through
independent suppliers and/or affiliates. 8 A French intra-firm transaction is
defined as trade with an affiliate controlled by a single French entity with
at least 50% of its equity capital. The SESSI defines two types of transac-
tion with independent suppliers: formal contractual relationships that refer to
alliances, franchising, joint-ventures and licensing agreements; and informal
relationships that involve transactions that use far less detailed contracts. 9
This survey provides little information at firm level. We retrieve this infor-
mation from the EAE database. It contains information on the balance sheet
and income statement of all firms located in France that have more than 20
employees from 1996 to 2002. The EAE provides firm-level information on
sales, capital, labor and intermediates use, fixed assets, as well as the 4-digit
NAF700 10 sectoral classification of the firm.
3.2 Endogenous Variable: Sourcing Modes
Our first step is to distinguish firms that source their inputs through indepen-
dent suppliers from those that source their input through affiliates. We use
the detailed HS4-digit classification to obtain the information as to whether
goods have been imported through affiliates or through independent suppliers.
The dependent variable, yijl, takes the value of one if firm i sources input j
from country l through an independent supplier and 0 if the input is imported
from an affiliate. We take into account the country dimension because HS4
8A transaction is defined as a specific product imported from a country by a firm.
Some transactions were broken into two lines in cases where the firm had to an-
nounce an amount higher than the one previously filled by the customs services.
We aggregate these lines.
9 15767 (21.8%) are intra-firm transaction, 45502 (62.9%) are informal outsourcing,
1099 (1.5%) are formal outsourcing and 10023 (13.8%) are mixed strategies (a
combination of two sourcing modes).
10Nomenclature d’Activite´ franc¸aise: nomenclature of French activities.
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goods produced in low-income countries are very different from similar goods
produced in high income countries (Schott, 2004).
yijl =

1 if the transaction has been imported from an independent supplier
0 if the transaction has been imported from an affiliate
We restrict our analysis to manufacturing sectors but we do not consider the
manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco because there is no de-
tailed firm-level information for these sectors from the EAE. We exclude firms
active in the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel since the sourcing modes in this industry are likely to be determined
by factors such as national sovereignty (Antra`s, 2003). This leaves us with
2619 firms realizing 72391 transactions among which 15767 are imported from
affiliates, 46954 are outsourced (formal and informal), and 9670 have been
completed using both modes. For our empirical analysis, we exclude firms
that import inputs from independent suppliers and from their affiliates simul-
taneously (mixed strategies).
3.3 Main Explanatory Variables
The model requires a careful approximation of the cost share of input provided
by supplier, z. The EEA data set provides information on the total amount
of inputs supplied to French firms by independent and affiliated suppliers,
irrespective of their location. 11 Using this information, we define z as the
share of inputs from suppliers in French firms’ output:
11These inputs correspond to the materials and equipment, the small materials and
some inputs from general sub-contracting.
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z =
Input from suppliers
Output
We also use the EAE database to estimate firm level total factor produc-
tivity. The TFP is estimated as the residual of a three-factor Cobb-Douglas
production function, with labor and deflated values of capital and material
inputs as production factors. Labor is the firm-specific number of employees.
The deflators are obtained from the national accounts system of the French
statistical office (INSEE). 12 We estimate the production function using the
Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology. The Olley and Pakes methodology con-
trols for the simultaneity bias that arises from the endogeneity of a firm’s
input selection, which will exist if a firm responds to unobservable produc-
tivity shocks by adjusting its input choices. This response yields correlation
between the stochastic error term and an explanatory variable in the estima-
tion of the production function, thus leading to a biased OLS estimator. The
Olley and Pakes estimator corrects for this possible bias by using the firm’s
investment decision as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. We present
this methodology in Appendix A.
We follow Nunn (2007) and capture the variation in contracting environments
across countries using the “rule of law” variable for the year 2000 from the
Governance Matters VI database (Kaufmann et al., 2006). This variable is
established on the basis of polls of experts or surveys of businessmen/citizens.
It is related to the perceptions of the effectiveness and predictability of the
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. The variable is configured such
that a higher value is associated with a better contracting environment.
12Nominal values of output are deflated using two-digit sectoral price indexes. Ma-
terial inputs are deflated using two-digit sectoral price indexes for intermediate
inputs published by the INSEE.
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3.3.1 Other Control Variables
The theoretical predictions of the model rely partially on the assumption that
the fixed cost of sourcing intermediate inputs through an independent supplier
is higher than the fixed cost of sourcing through an affiliate. We include the
fixed costs of French firms in our baseline regression. The fixed costs have been
defined as total physical assets scaled by sales.
We know from the model that βo influences the sourcing choice and control
for it in the empirical specification by including a firm’s size variable. The
idea that that firm’s size confers a bargaining advantage has received some
empirical support (Porter, 1974). The size of the firm is approximated by the
number of its employees in 1999.
The organizational choice might also be influenced by country-specific endow-
ment and firm-specific factor intensities. According to Antra`s (2003), capital
intensive goods are imported from affiliates located in countries that are rel-
atively abundant in capital. We use data on countries’ stock physical and
human capital and on firm-level factor intensity to examine this relationship.
The country-specific endowment data are taken from Trefler (2002). Capital
endowment (K/L) is measured by the natural log of the ratio of the physi-
cal capital stock divided by the total labor force. Human capital endowment
(H/L) is measured by the natural log of the ratio of workers completing high
school to the total labor force. The data on firm factor intensity are taken from
the EAE. We use the firm-level capital-labor ratio, k/l, to proxy the firm’s
capital intensity and its per-employee spending on information technology, s,
to roughly control for a firm’s skill intensity.
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3.4 Estimation Strategy
We analyze the choice between outsourcing and vertical integration using a
logit model at the transaction level. From our theoretical framework, the orga-
nizational choice is a function of a firm’s fixed costs f , a firm’s productivity θ,
the supplier’s input intensity z, the primitive bargaining power βo and the con-
tracting environment of the exporting country, δl. In Equation (7), we denote
by subscript i, the firm-specific variable and by subscript l the country-specific
variable.
yijl=λ0 + λ1fi + λ2zi + λ3θi + λ4βoi + λ5δl (7)
+NAF +HS + ijl
where NAF and HS are the sets of sector and product specific fixed effects,
respectively. ijl is the stochastic error term. To estimate the empirical impli-
cation of the model, we also need to estimate how the relationship between
the intensity in suppliers’ inputs and the contracting environment evolves with
the productivity. We therefore interact these explanatory variables with the
productivity θ.
yijl=λ0 + λ1fi + λ2zi + λ3θi + λ4βoi + λ5δl (8)
+λ6 (zi × θi) + λ7 (θi × δl)
+NAF +HS + ijl
The interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear models, such as logit,
is complex. Ai and Norton (2003) argue that odds ratios have no meaningful
interpretation for the interaction effects. We follow Ai and Norton (2003) and
compute the cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable
and the statistical significance of the entire cross-derivative. The interaction
effect is conditional on other independent variables. Because there are two
additive terms, each of which can be positive or negative, the interaction
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effect may have different signs for different values of covariates. 13 We discuss
the correct interpretation of the interaction effects in the fifth section.
The logit model relies crucially on the assumption of homoskedasticity in
the underlying latent variable model. We use the Huber-White method to
correct for heteroscedasticity. Finally, because the model is non-linear in its
parameters, the marginal effects are not constant and must be interpreted
at some sample point. We choose the means of the independent variables for
this evaluation. The descriptive statistics and a correlation table are shown in
Appendix B (Table B.1 and B.2).
4 A First Look at the Data
4.1 Fixed Costs
The organizational choice depends crucially on ranking of fixed costs. We first
have a closer look at this ranking by comparing the cumulative distributions of
firms’ fixed costs in Figure 3. We only take into account firms that import at
least 80% of their total import volumes either through outsourcing agreements,
O, or through their affiliates, V. 14 The graph points to a first-order stochastic
dominance of outsourcing with respect to fixed costs. Firms that source inputs
through independent suppliers have higher fixed costs than firms that import
through their affiliates.
We analyze systematic differences between both distributions using the non-
parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sided test (KS-test). The KS-test has
13We have used the Stata command ”inteff” to compute the marginal effect of the
interaction terms. See Norton et al. (2004).
14We find qualitatively similar results when we modify the threshold value of 80%,
in particular, when firms source entirely through either one of the modes. The
drawback of using this latter approach is a loss of 53% in the total number of
firms.
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Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution of French firms’ fixed costs, in logarithm
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Source: EAE and SESSI’s survey, authors’ computation.
the advantage of making no assumption about the sample distribution. It
determines if two distributions differ significantly. Therefore, it calculates the
largest difference between the observed and expected cumulative frequencies,
which is called D-statistics. This statistic is compared against the critical
D-statistic for that sample size. The results of the KS-test are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of fixed cost distributions
Difference P-value Corrected
fo > fv 0.0049 0.982
fo < fv -0.0948 0.001
Combined K-S 0.0948 0.002 0.002
The largest difference between the distribution functions is 0.0948 which is
statistically significant at 1%. Thus, the null hypothesis that both fixed costs
distributions are equal is rejected. From the left-hand side of the KS test,
we can reject the hypothesis that firms that source through their affiliates
20
(V -type) have on average larger fixed costs than firms that source through
independent suppliers (O-type). The largest difference between the distribu-
tion functions is 0.0049, which is not significant. From the right-hand side of
the test, we accept the hypothesis that V -type firms are less productive than
O-type firms. 15
4.2 Productivity and the Choice between Sourcing Modes
We look at the distribution of French firms’ TFP in Figure 4. The TFP dis-
tribution of French firms is not too far from log-normal even if it is slightly
right-skewed. It seems that the TFP distribution of French firms does not
differ from other firms’ TFP distributions (Sutton, 1997; Cabral and Mata,
2003).
Fig. 4. Firm-level TFP, in logarithm
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Source: EAE and SESSI’s survey, authors’ computation.
15Note that increasing the threshold value of 80 % to 100% does not qualitatively
change the results.
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We have a closer look at firm heterogeneity in Table 2. It reports the number
of transactions and the volume of imports according to the productivity distri-
bution of French firms. In particular, it presents four quartiles that correspond
to low (1st quartile), medium (2nd quartile), high (3rd quartile), and the most
productive firms (4th quartile). Firms in the 4th quartile are on average 1.7%
percent more productive than firms in the 1st quartile. 16
Table 2
Quartile distribution of intra-firm trade and outsourcing
(percentage of total in parentheses)
Quartile of TFP Average TFP Intra-Firm Trade Outsourcing Total
Number of transactions
First Quartile 3.67 6682 12812 19494
(34.3) (65.7)
Second Quartile 4.57 4865 11039 15904
(30.6) (69.4)
Third Quartile 5.09 6426 13721 20147
(31.9) (68.1)
Fourth Quartile 6.11 7464 19052 26516
(28.1) (71.9)
Total 4.86 25437 56624 82061
Import Volume (1000 Euro)
First Quartile 3.67 8853.3 8251.0 17104.3
(51.8) (48.2)
Second Quartile 4.57 5209.0 4910.2 10119.1
(51.5) (48.5)
Third Quartile 5.09 11774.1 8333.6 20107.7
(58.6) (41.4)
Fourth Quartile 6.11 11143.1 21404.4 32547.5
(34.2) (65.8)
Total 4.86 36979.5 42899.2 79878.7
Given productivity, firms that source through their foreign affiliates trade less
- both in terms of the number and the volume of transactions. We find a
16Note that the number of total transactions is slightly higher than the total number
of transactions presented in Table 4. This result is mainly driven by firms that have
mixed strategies.
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Table 3
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of productivity distribution
Difference P-value Corrected
TFPo > TFPv 0.0124 0.890
TFPo < TFPv -0.0930 0.001
Combined K-S 0.0930 0.003 0.002
concentration of activities among the most productive firms.
In order to compare firms’ productivity according to their sourcing mode, we
compare their cumulative distributions of TFP in Figure 5. The graph points
to a first-order stochastic dominance of outsourcing with respect to TFP.
Firms that outsource are more productive than firms that import through
their affiliates but not over the whole distribution.
Fig. 5. Cumulative distribution of French firm’s TFP, in logarithm
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Source: EAE and SESSI’s survey, authors’ computation.
The results of the two-sided KS-tests in Table 3 confirm that the most produc-
tive firms import from independent suppliers. The KS-test shows that both
distributions of TFPs are statistically different at 1% level of significance. Im-
portantly, the two-sided test rejects the null hypothesis of higher TFPs under
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integration. However, it accepts the hypothesis that O-firms have higher TFPs
than V -firms.
4.3 Suppliers’ Input Intensity
Table 4 reports the sector-level aggregates figures concerning the intensity
in suppliers’ inputs, intra-firm trade and outsourcing. The suppliers’ input
intensity presented in Table 4 is expressed as the average intensity in suppliers’
input within each sector.
For sake of simplicity, we aggregate the NAF700 sectors into 14 industries. We
present the number of import transactions and their share as a percentage of
the total number of transactions. About 65% of the transactions are exchanged
through outsourcing agreements while intra-firm import relates to only 22%
of all transactions. The share of transactions that are imported through mixed
strategies 17 concerns about 14% of the total number of transactions.
Inter-industry differences with respect to the sourcing modes at transaction
level are also apparent in Table 4. Within the six industries with the higher
share of outsourcing, four have high relative intensity in suppliers’ input:
leather products (77.9%), other transport equipment (77.3%), publishing and
printing (72.8%) and textile products (73.9%). A higher share of intra-firm im-
port is found in the industries of other non-metallic mineral products (34.7%)
and electrical components (32.5%). Both industries are relatively intensive in
headquarter services. This observation is in line with the findings of Antra`s and
Helpman (2004) that firms in headquarter-intensive industries are importing
mostly from their affiliates.
17A combination of both sourcing modes.
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Table 4
Number of import transactions by sourcing modes (percentage of total into paren-
theses)
Industries Number Total Intra-firm Outsourcing Mixed
z˜‡ of firms Import Strategies
Textiles, textile products 10.4 101 2462 380 1820 262
(15.4) (73.9) (10.6)
Leather, leather products 14.9 66 3650 616 2845 189
(16.9) (77.9) (5.2)
Wood, paper 2.1 165 3617 513 2895 209
(14.2) (80.0) (5.8)
Publishing and printing 12.2 80 886 203 645 38
(22.9) (72.8) (4.3)
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 5.4 478 13814 3110 8904 1800
(22.5) (64.5) (13.0)
Pharmaceutical products 6.7 168 4701 1026 3234 441
(21.8) (68.8) (9.4)
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.7 128 2843 987 1699 157
(34.7) (59.8) (5.5)
Basic metals and fabricated metal 6.2 314 5653 661 4397 595
(11.7) (77.8) (10.5)
Machinery. equipment n.e.c. 13.0 408 9025 2110 5638 1277
(23.4) (62.5) (14.1)
Electrical component 5.0 157 6177 2010 3140 1027
(32.5) (50.8) (16.6)
Electrical equipment 10.5 206 7206 1806 3905 1495
(25.1) (54.2) (20.7)
Motor vehicles 3.7 125 5279 851 3302 1126
(16.1) (62.5) (21.3)
Other transport equipment 26.3 53 2039 200 1577 262
(9.8) (77.3) (12.8)
Furniture 4.8 170 5039 1294 2953 792
(25.7) (58.6) (15.7)
Total 7.9 2619 72391 15767 46954 9670
(21.8) (64.9) (13.4)
‡: z˜ is the average intensity in suppliers’ input within each sector
4.4 Contracting Environment and Sourcing Modes
In order to examine the relationship between the contracting environment and
the sourcing mode of import, we create a country-specific variable that has
information on the share of intra-firm import from a specific country. This vari-
able is defined as the ratio between imports through foreign affiliates to total
French imports: Intra-Firm Share = Mv
Mo+Mv
, where Mv and Mo denote French
imports through affiliates and French import through independent suppliers,
respectively. 18
18We exclude countries for which we observe less than 10 transaction. Notice that
the positive correlation is not sensitive to this threshold.
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Fig. 6. Contracting environment and intra-firm share
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Figure 6 shows that a country-specific contracting environment matters. We
find a positive correlation between the intra-firm share and the rule of law
variables. This finding is similar to the one reported by Nunn and Trefler
(2008) who show that the share of US intra-firm import is positively related
to the exporting country’s contracting environment. It is however not in line
with our theoretical prediction, since a better contracting environment should
increase the likelihood of outsourcing given the ranking of French firms’ fixed
costs. We investigate this result in Section 5.
4.5 Correlation between Sourcing Modes
As in Tomiura (2007), we look at the correlation between different interna-
tional sourcing modes in Table 5. The upper panel (A) of this table shows the
correlations at firm level. The inter-industry correlation between outsourc-
ing and intra-firm imports is negative although insignificant. We find substi-
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tuability between mixed strategies and outsourcing and also between mixed
strategies and intra-firm imports.
Table 5
Correlation between sourcing modes (p-values into parentheses)
Intra-firm Trade Outsourcing Mixed Strategies
Panel (A): At the firm level
Intra-firm trade 1
Outsourcing -0.15 1
Mixed transaction -0.23* -0.93*** 1
Panel (B): At the transaction level
Intra-firm trade 1
Outsourcing -0.84*** 1
Mixed transaction -0.03 -0.52*** 1
The correlation is for the share in the number of transaction across 239 industries
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Panel (B) shows stronger inter-industry correlation at product level. The cor-
relation between intra-firm imports and outsourcing is negative and signif-
icant at 1% level of significance. The correlation between outsourcing and
mixed strategies is also significant and negative at 1% level of significance.
The inter-industry correlations suggest a substitutability between the differ-
ent modes of sourcing at product level. This finding is consistent with our
theoretical model.
Overall, these cross-industry correlations suggest that the level of the firm
might not be best suited for our empirical analysis since a firm may import
(different) goods using different sourcing modes from different countries.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Specification
Table 6 presents the estimates of the marginal effects of the regressions at
transaction level. We evaluate the marginal effect at the sample means, which
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measures the effect for a firm with characteristics equal to the sample averages.
In the fourth specification (S1-S4), we estimate the model as close as possible
to the theoretical framework. 19 Note that all variables have been centered
around their respective mean and that all specifications include a full set of
French sector and product specific effects.
The first specification is an estimation of Equation 7. Except for the contract-
ing environment whose coefficient has an unexpected sign, the marginal effects
are in line with the theoretical predictions of the model and are significant at
the 1% significance level.
Turning to the impact of the interaction terms on other covariate’ effects,
they do not qualitatively influence the results of the baseline regression. We
use the Ai and Norton (2003) methodology to interpret the interaction effect
whenever this effect varies widely across observations.
We show in specification (S1) that firms that have higher fixed costs choose
to source their inputs through independent suppliers. 20 This is in line with
our theoretical assumption. Consistent with this finding, we observe that firms
that have a higher productivity level also have a higher probability of sourcing
their input through independent suppliers. We find that a one percent increase
in firm’s TFP increases the probability of outsourcing by about a 0.028 per-
centage point, holding the other explanatory variables constant. These results
are significant at a one percent level and robust across specifications.
Turning to the suppliers’ input intensity, its marginal effect is positive and
significant at 1%. Holding all other explanatory variables constant, we find
that going from the lowest to the highest intensity in suppliers’ input increases
19Notice that the results remain robust to the exclusion of formal contractual rela-
tionships (alliances, franchising, joint ventures, licensing agreements). Only 1.5%
of the transactions are formal outsourcing after the exclusion of mixed strategies.
20Notice that the results remain robust to the exclusion of the fixed costs and the
primitive bargaining power variables.
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Table 6
Dependent variable: Y=1 for outsourcing (marginal effects presented.)
Label (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Fixed Costs fi 0.034a 0.034a 0.034a 0.034a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TFP θi 0.028a 0.030a 0.028a 0.030a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Supplier’s Input Intensity zi 0.307a 0.242a 0.306a 0.242a
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Contracting Environment δl -0.105a -0.103a -0.107a -0.105a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Primitive Bargaining Power βoi 0.006a 0.006a 0.006a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction term 1 θi × zi 0.167a 0.165a
(0.037) (0.037)
Interaction term 2 θi × δl -0.034b -0.031b
(0.014) (0.014)
French Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 62670 62670 62670 62670
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.058
Log Likelihood -33316 -33281 -33312 -33277
Robust standard error in brackets. a, b , c significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
the probability to outsource by 30.7 percentage points. This finding supports
the first implication of the model. The probability that firms import their
input from independent suppliers increases with the suppliers’ input intensity
of production.
In specification (S2), we introduce a multiplicative term between the sup-
pliers’ inputs intensity variable and the firm-level TFP variable in order to
examine the second testable implication of the theoretical model. We find the
mean interaction effect is significant and positive. This finding is robust across
observations and confirms the theoretical prediction of the model. Greater in-
tensity in suppliers’ inputs increases the marginal effect of the TFP variable
on the probability to source through an independent supplier.
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We find that a better contracting environment has a significant and negative
impact on the probability of sourcing inputs through an independent supplier
in specification (S1). Going from the lower to the upper bound of our “rule
of law” variable decreases the probability to outsource by a 10.5 percentage
point in the first specification. However, the theoretical model does not offer
any predictions concerning the intercept-shift effect of the contracting environ-
ment variable on the sourcing mode. Looking at the mean interaction effect in
specification (S3), we find that a higher productivity strengthens the negative
marginal effect of the contracting environment on the probability of sourcing
inputs through an independent supplier. Whereas the magnitude and the sign
of the interaction effect are robust across observations, the significance level
is not. The marginal effect of the interaction term is positive but insignif-
icant for all observations that have larger predicted values than 0.8. These
findings are not consistent with the third testable implication of the model
but is in line with the prediction of a recent study by Antra`s and Helpman
(2008). According to the authors, the foreign supplier and the final good pro-
ducer produce intermediate inputs that are partially contractible. They show
that if a better contracting environment reduces the non-contractible share of
the supplier’s input then the incentives required by the final-good producer
increases. Thus increasing the foreign contracting environment increases the
likelihood of sourcing inputs through affiliates. 21
Finally, we find that the primitive bargaining power measured by the loga-
rithm of the size of the firm is also positive and significant at a 1% level in
specification. Holding all explanatory variable constant, a one percent increase
in the primitive bargaining power increases the probability of outsourcing by
21Antra`s and Helpman (2008) also show that a better contracting environment
increases firms’ entry. Considering our ranking of fixed costs, these new firms are
less productive and import from affiliates.
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about 0.006 percentage point.
5.2 Intermediate Inputs
We follow the methodology developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) to dis-
tinguish between final goods and imported intermediate inputs. For a suffi-
ciently disaggregated level of sector classification, at HS3-level, we identify
intermediate inputs as the products imported which are classified in an other
sector than the sector in which the French firm reports its main activity. The
results using imported intermediate inputs are reported in Table 7.
Table 7
Imported intermediate inputs’ sample. Dependent variable: Y=1 for outsourcing
(marginal effects presented.)
Label (I1) (I2) (I3) (I4)
Fixed Costs fi 0.041a 0.040a 0.041a 0.040a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TFP θi 0.027a 0.030a 0.027a 0.030a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Supplier’s Input Intensity zi 0.372a 0.282a 0.371a 0.281a
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Contracting Environment δl -0.074a -0.072a -0.076a -0.074a
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Primitive Bargaining Power βoi 0.008a 0.008a 0.008a 0.008a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interaction term 1 θi × zi 0.276a 0.274a
(0.041) (0.041)
Interaction term 2 θi × δl -0.024 -0.017
(0.016) (0.017)
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 45829 45829 45829 45829
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.067 0.064 0.067
Log Likelihood -22731 -22670 -22729 -22670
Robust standard error into brackets. a, b , c significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
For both interaction terms, the sign of the marginal effects and the magni-
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tude of the standard errors remain in line with the one found using the whole
sample. Using the intermediate inputs sample slightly decreases the contract-
ing environment’s effect while it increases significantly the impact of the first
interaction term. Notice that the Log likelihood is smaller when using the im-
ported intermediate inputs sample. This is an indication that the sample of
imported intermediate inputs fits the model better.
We find the first interaction terms positive and significant mean effects on the
probability of sourcing inputs through an independent supplier. We find also
that these results are robust across observations. This tends to confirm that
the intermediate input sample is better suited for our analysis of the sourcing
mode.
Our findings suggest that the contracting environment and firm’s productivity
level have a negative - albeit insignificant - mean interaction effect of the on
the sourcing decision.
5.3 Factor Intensities and Factor Endowments
In Table 8, we consider the role of factor endowment and firm-level factor
intensity in explaining the organizational choice. We show the results of esti-
mations from the intermediate inputs sample in specifications (R1) to (R3). 22
In specification (R1), we find the countrys skill endowment and the firm-
specific skill intensity to be important determinants of the organizational
choice. The likelihood of sourcing intermediate inputs through an indepen-
dent supplier decreases with the skill intensity of the firm’s production pro-
cess. This finding confirms earlier results at aggregate level by Antra`s (2003),
22We find similar results using the whole sample. These results are presented in
Table C.1 of Appendix C.
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Table 8
Robustness check: Dependent variable: Y=1 for outsourcing (marginal effects pre-
sented)
Intermediate Inputs
Label (R1) (R2) (R3)
Fixed Costs fi 0.040a 0.091a 0.090a
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
TFP θi 0.028a 0.046a 0.049a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Supplier’s Input Intensity zi 0.394a 0.372a 0.281a
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Contracting Environment δl -0.015 -0.184a -0.082a
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Primitive Bargaining Power βoi 0.012a 0.008a 0.011a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Skill Endowment (Country) Hl/Ll -0.057a -0.053a
(0.005) (0.005)
Skill Intensity (Firm) si -0.006a -0.005a
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital-Labor Ratio (Country) Kl/Ll 0.033a 0.031a
(0.005) (0.005)
Capital-Labor Ratio (Firm) (k/l)i -0.065a -0.065a
(0.004) (0.004)
Interaction term 1 θi × zi 0.321a
(0.045)
Interaction term 2 θi × δl 0.038c
(0.020)
Interaction term 3 si ×Hl/Ll -0.014a -0.013a
(0.003) (0.002)
Interaction term 4 (k/l)i×Kl/Ll 0.005 0.006c
(0.004) (0.004)
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 42123 42123 42123
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.075 0.083
Log Likelihood -20715 -20637 -20459
Robust standard error into brackets. a, b , c significantly different from 0
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Yeaple (2006) and Nunn and Trefler (2008). Moreover, the probability of im-
porting inputs through independent suppliers is lower in countries that are rel-
atively skill-abundant. The mean interaction term between the skill intensity
and the skill endowment variable is negative and significant. The probability
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of sourcing inputs through affiliates is higher for high-skilled intensive firms
that import from high-skilled abundant countries. The inclusion of the skill
intensity and endowment variables sharply reduces the significance level of the
marginal effect of the contracting environment variable. The role of the con-
tracting environment is no longer important once we control for a country’s
specific skill endowment.
In specification (R2), we substitute the skill intensity and the skill endowment
variables by the firm’s and country’s capital-labor ratio. The firm’s capital in-
tensity variable has a negative impact on the decision to source input through
independent suppliers. This result is in line with Antra`s (2003). We find how-
ever that the probability of sourcing through affiliates is higher, the higher
the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country. In our database, the bulk of
outsourcing is placed among European countries, USA and Canada. Among
these countries, the largest recipients of outsourcing, Germany, Italy and Aus-
tria, have low skill endowments but high capital-labor ratios. The mean in-
teraction term between the firm-level capital intensity and the country-level
capital-labor ratio variables is positive and insignificant. We do not find any
relationship between the capital intensities and the capital endowment.
6 Conclusion
Recent theoretical evidences have stressed the importance of a firm’s pro-
ductivity for their mode of sourcing foreign intermediate inputs. In Antra`s
and Helpman (2004), the most productive firms can compensate the foreign
affiliate set-up costs, and source their intermediate inputs internally in the
headquarter-intensive sector. We propose a slight modification of the Antra`s
and Helpman (2004) model by considering a production function that is firm-
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specific. The model predicts that the likelihood to import from an independent
supplier is increasing with (i) the production intensity in supplier’s inputs,
(ii) the final-good producer’s productivity and its production intensity in sup-
plier’s input, and (iii) its productivity and the contracting environment of the
supplier’s country.
We make several improvements to the previous empirical literature. First, we
use firm-level data that have detailed information on the mode of sourcing at
product-level and allow us to distinguish between final goods and intermediate
inputs. Second, the data have sufficient information to compute total factor
productivity at firm-level using Olley and Pakes (1996) correction for endo-
geneity of input selection. Third, we create a measure of intensity of supplier
inputs at firm-level, which is derived from the theory.
The data indicate that French firms that source their intermediate inputs
through independent suppliers have a higher fixed cost than firms that import
intermediate inputs from their affiliates. The results further show that greater
intensity in suppliers’ inputs increases the likelihood of outsourcing. This re-
sult is in line with the prediction of the model. We find moreover that highly
productive firms that use suppliers’ inputs intensively in their production pro-
cess have a higher probability to outsource. However, the data indicate that
firms tend to import their inputs from their affiliates located in countries that
have a better contracting environment. This might be explained by the level of
contractibility of intermediate inputs as emphasized by Antra`s and Helpman
(2008). A careful examination of the contractibility hypothesis goes beyond
the scope of our present analysis. Further research is needed to determine the
exact nature of the relationship between contractibility and the sourcing mode
of inputs.
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Appendices
A TFP Measurement
We use the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) semiparametric method to estimate
firm-level TFP. This method allows robust estimation of the production func-
tion. It takes into account the endogeneity of some inputs, the exit of firms
as well as the unobserved permanent differences among firms. The main as-
sumption that the OP technique relies on, is the existence of a monotonic
relationship between investment and firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. Es-
timation has been realized for each one of the 52 sectors (3 digit).
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Qit = λ0 + λKKit + λLLit + λMMit + θit + it
and denote the logarithm of output, capital, labor and intermediate inputs
with Qit, Kit, Lit Mit, respectively. Subscripts i and t stand for firm and time,
θit denotes productivity, and it stands for measurement error in output. It is
assumed that θit follows an exogenous first order Markov process:
θit+1 = E[θit+1|θt] + υit+1
where υit is uncorrelated with the productivity shock. The endogeneity prob-
lem stems from the fact that Kit and Lit are correlated with the θit. This
makes λOLS to be biased and inconsistent. Given that investment is strictly
monotonic, it can be inverted as:
θit = h(Iit, Kit)
and substituting this function in the production function leads to
Qit = λLLit + λMMit + Φ(Iit, Kit) + it
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where Φ(Iit, Kit) = λ0+λKKit+h(Iit, Kit). Since the functional form of Φ(·) is
not known, we cannot estimate the coefficients of the capital and labor variable
directly. Instead, we use a linear model that includes a series estimator using
a full interaction term polynomial in capital and investment to approximate
Φ(·). From this first stage, the consistent estimates of the coefficients on labor
and material inputs as well as the estimate of the polynomial in Iit and Kit
are obtained.
The second stage takes into account the survival of firms. These probabilities
are given by:
Pr{χt+1 = 1|θt+1(Kt+1), Jt}=Pr{θt+1 ≥ θt+1(Kt+1)|θt+1(Kt+1), θt}
=ϕ{θt+1(Kt+1), θt}
=ϕ(it, Kt)
=Pt
Where the probability that a firm survives at time t + 1 is conditional on its
information set at time t, Jt and θt+1. This is equal to the probability that the
firm’s productivity is greater than a threshold, θt+1, which in turn depends
on the capital stock. The survival probability can be written as a function of
investment and capital stock at time t. Thus, we estimate a probit regression
on a polynomial in investment and capital controlling for year specific effects.
Now, consider the expectation Qt+1 − λLLt+1 conditional on the information
at time t and survival at t+ 1.
E[Qt+1 − λLLt+1|Kt+1, χt+1 = 1]=λ0 + λKKt+1 + E[θt+1|θt, χt+1 = 1]
=λKKt+1 + g(θt+1, θt)
θit follows an exogenous first-order Markov process. We substitute the produc-
tivity shock in the above equation using the result from the first stage.
Qt+1 − λLLt+1 = λKKt+1 + g(Pt,Φt − λKKt) + υt+1 + it
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The third step takes the estimates from λL, Φt, and Pt and substitutes them
for the true values. The series estimator is obtained by running a non-linear
least squares on the equation
Qt+1 − λLLt+1 − λMMt+1 = c+ λKKt+1 +
s−M∑
j=0
s∑
M=0
λMj(φˆt − λKKt)M Pˆ jt + et
where s is the order of the polynomial used to estimate the coefficient on
capital.
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B Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table
Table B.1
Summary statistics of variables
Label Mean Std.
Dev.
Obs.
Fixed Costs (Log) fi -1.116 0.917 62670
TFP (Log) θi 0.003 1.066 62721
Supplier’s Input Intensity zi 0.001 0.097 62721
Firm Size (Log) βoi -0.002 0.132 62721
Contracting Environment δl -0.085 1.414 62721
Country Skill Endowment (Log) Hl/Ll 0.001 2.294 56912
Firm Skill Intensity (Log) si 0.001 0.432 56912
Country Capital-Labor Ratio (Log) Kl/Ll 0.001 0.966 56912
Firm Capital-Labor Ratio (Log) (k/l)i 0.001 0.524 56912
Interaction term 1 zi × θi 0.026 0.115 62721
Interaction term 2 θi × δl -0.005 0.140 62721
Interaction term 3 si ×Hl/Ll 0.043 0.942 56912
Interaction term 4 (k/l)i ×Kl/Ll 0.053 0.592 56912
Non-interacted variables have been centered around their mean.
Table B.2
Correlation matrix
fi θi zi β0 δl si Hl/Ll (k/l)i Kl/Ll
fi 1.000
θi -0.164a 1.000
zi -0.205a 0.253a 1.000
β0i 0.126a 0.198a -0.005 1.000
δl 0.100a -0.039a -0.036a -0.016a 1.000
si 0.006a 0.059a 0.091a 0.236a 0.005a 1.000
Hl/Ll 0.016a 0.013a 0.011a 0.059a 0.454a 0.044a 1.000
(k/l)i 0.765a 0.071a -0.152a 0.150a 0.104a 0.076a 0.050a 1.000
Kl/Ll 0.108a -0.067a -0.044a -0.021a 0.584a -0.014a 0.319a 0.104a 1.000
a, significantly different from 0 at 1% level.
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C Robustness Checks: Factor Intensities and Factor Endowments
using the Whole Sample
Table C.1
Robustness check: Dependent variable: Y=1 for outsourcing (marginal effects pre-
sented)
Whole Sample
Label (R4) (R5) (R6)
Fixed Costs fi 0.034a 0.095a 0.096a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
TFP θi 0.028a 0.049a 0.051a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Supplier’s Input Intensity zi 0.326a 0.318a 0.241a
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Contracting Environment δl -0.035c -0.195a -0.106a
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Primitive Bargaining Power βoi 0.010a 0.006a 0.008a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Skill Endowment (Country) Hl/Ll -0.056a -0.052a
(0.005) (0.005)
Skill Intensity (Firm) si -0.006a -0.004a
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital-Labor Ratio (Country) Kl/Ll 0.029a 0.032a
(0.004) (0.004)
Capital-Labor Ratio (Firm) (k/l)i -0.078a -0.078a
(0.003) (0.003)
Interaction term 1 zi × θi 0.221a
(0.040)
Interaction term 2 θi × δl 0.017
(0.017)
Interaction term 3 si ×Hl/Ll -0.010a -0.010a
(0.002) (0.002)
Interaction term 4 (k/l)i×Kl/Ll 0.020a 0.020a
(0.004) (0.004)
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Products Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 56912 56912 56912
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.068 0.072
Log Likelihood -30161 -29967 -29809
Robust standard error into brackets. a, b , c significantly different from 0
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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D Results from aggregate level data
We follow Yeaple (2006) and Bernard et al. (2007) and use aggregate data
on intra-firm trade between French parent firms and their foreign affiliate
to measure FDI by French multinational firms. The data comes from the
1999 SESSI survey. For each French affiliate of a French multinational firm,
we observe (1) its country of residence, (2) the value of its exports to its
parent firm (3) the type of products it exports (at 3-digit level) and (4) the
manufacturing sector of its parent firm. Since our primary focus is on industry
variation, our measure of intra-firm trade is the share of intra-firm imports in
total imports by French manufacturing sectors, products and origin countries.
Total imports has been computed as the sum of imports from affiliates plus
imports from independent suppliers from the SESSI survey. 23 The dataset
contains 52 manufacturing sectors, 67 imported products and 135 countries.
We measure the extent of dispersion across firms within an industry using two
measures of productivity dispersion. We calculate first, firm’s total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology and compute
for each French manufacturing sector the standard deviation of the logarithm
of firm TFP across firms within an industry. Second, we follow Yeaple (2006)
and compute the standard deviation of the logarithm of firm sale across firms
within an industry. The differences in firm size as measured by final good sales
reflect differences in productivity because more productive firms should sell
more. We estimate the model using an OLS and a Poisson regressions. we
control for product and country specific heterogeneity by using a full set of
products and country fixed effects. The Poisson method of estimation has the
advantage of avoiding to take the logarithm of zero values (? and ?).
23 For each combination of manufacturing sector and country, we aggregate imports
at the 3-digit product level.
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Table D.1
Dependent variable: share of intra-firm trade
Dispersion Measure OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Productivity -9.493a -0.341a
(3.198) (0.113)
Sales -2.463c -0.085c
(1.314) (0.045)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13593 13593 13593 13593
Positive observations 7115 7115 7115 7115
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Log likelihood -362598.26 -362733.29
Robust standard error into brackets. a, b , c significantly different from 0 at 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
Our results suggests that intra-firm import is lower in industry with higher
dispersion in productivity. This results is robust to the measure of dispersion
and to the econometric methodology. The results is consistent with the pre-
diction of Antra`s and Helpman (2004), but for a different ranking of fixed
costs.
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